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Abstract 
 
Using an international sample of firms from 28 countries, we document that there exists a 
negative relationship between political connections and the informativeness of stock price, as 
measured by idiosyncratic volatility (IV). This finding is robust to alternative regression 
specifications, sub-samples analyses, and concerns related to endogeneity. A more detailed 
analysis shows that out of the different types of possible connections, the connectedness of the 
owners is the primary driver of this result. Further, the negative association is only significant for 
firms in countries characterized by low institutional quality (i.e. corrupted countries, countries 
with low access to external equity markets, and countries with low media penetration). There is 
no evidence of any relation between political connections and stock price informativeness for 
firms in countries characterized by high institutional quality. Overall, our results show that 
although political connections exacerbate rent-seeking that weaken the firms’ information 
environments on average, the negative information consequences are compensated by the 
countries’ institutional quality.  
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INTRODUCTION 
With the rise of alternative ideologies such as state capitalism, there has been an increase in the research 
interest on the role of political connections in influencing various important issues in the accounting, 
finance, and international business literature. The findings in the exisiting literature indicate that the 
presence of political connections can be regarded as a double-edged sword for corporations around the 
world. Some current studies (such as Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006) have documented that political 
connections could improve firm value. However, other studies such as Chen, Yuan, and Kim (2010) and 
Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley (2011) highlight the drawbacks of establishing connections. The former 
shows that political connections reduce analyst forecast accuracy and the latter study shows that they 
reduce earnings quality. Several recent studies also examine the effect of different institutional qualities 
across countries on the consequences of political connection. For example,  Brockman, Rui, and Zhou 
(2013) examine how political connections influence post-merger stock performance and find that 
politically connected bidders located in countries with high institutional quality tend to perform poorer, 
compared to their unconnected counterparts. Boubakri, Mansi, and Saffar (2013) examine the interaction 
between political institutions, political connections, and corporate risk-taking activities and their findings 
suggest that managers of politically connected firms are more willing to undertake risky projects and this 
finding is stronger in countries with weak political institutions. 
In this study, we focus on the cross-country differences in the effect of political connections on the 
informativeness of stock prices.  Following prior literature (such as Ferreira & Laux, 2007, Fernandes & 
Ferreira, 2008; Fernandes & Ferreira, 2009; Gul, Srinidhi, & Ng, 2011, Kim & Shi, 2012), we use the 
idiosyncratic stock price volatility (IV) as our measure of firm-specific stock price informativeness.  
We are motivated to examine this issue because of several factors. First, the findings in the current 
literature suggest two competing hypotheses on the relationship between political connections and the 
information environment. On one hand, political connections could benefit firms and investors by 
reducing the transaction costs, expediting meritorious transactions and tapping into the available 
management expertise. In this respect, the benefits of connections outweigh the associated costs, resulting 
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in greater efficiency and more transparency. Therefore, we posit that political connections ar associated 
with an increase in stock price informativeness (information-increasing hypothesis). On the other hand, 
political connections could have adverse effects because of political rents arising from favoritism. 
Examples include the unmerited preferential awards of government contracts (Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001; 
Faccio, 2006) or bailouts (Faccio, Masulis, & McConnell, 2006) in return for the “compensation” exacted 
by the political or government officials involved. These illegitimate rents discourage openness and 
weaken the information environment. In this respect, we conjecture that political connections are 
associated with a decrease in stock price informativeness (information-decreasing hypothesis).  
In order to assess which one of these effects prevails, we examine the motives of establishing 
political connections. They are likely to differ, depending on the strength of institutional quality as 
highlighted by several recent papers (such as Brockman et al., 2013; Boubakri et al., 2013). In countries 
with strong and effective institutions, political rent-seeking is highly constrained because of two 
important reasons. First, significant disclosures are mandated to help investors and are implemented 
effectively by a non-corrupt regulatory enforcement mechanism. It therefore becomes more onerous for 
the politically connected firms to get unmerited favorable treatment surreptitiously. Second, when the 
rent-seeking is suspected, the adversely affected party (a supplier or an employee who has been rejected 
in favor of a connected party) is likely to successfully pursue legal claims against the entity providing the 
favors. On the other hand, in country with weak institutions and poor investor protection, political rent-
seeking can survive. In effect, the motive for a firm to acquire political connection in a country with weak 
institutions is likely to be the “benefits” of political rents whereas the motive for a similar firm in a 
country with strong institutions is likely to be the expertise of the connected party. Therefore, we predict 
that the information-increasing hypothesis should be more prevalent for firms located in countries with 
strong institutional quality. In contrast, we expect the information-decreasing hypothesis to be more 
pronounced for firms located in countries with low institutional quality. 
Using a sample of international firms from 28 countries, our first empirical finding reveals that 
overall, politically connected firms exhibit lower IV compared to similar non-connected peers i.e.,  the 
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stock prices of politically connected firms reflect less firm-specific information, compared to their non-
connected counterparts. This finding is supportive of the information-decreasing hypothesis. Second, our 
analysis shows that the adverse effect on IV is significant when the connections are made by the 
controlling shareholder at the firm level. This result is consistent with the rationale that firms with 
controlling shareholders where institutional influence is smaller, are more likely to seek rent through 
political connection made at the controlling shareholder level. In our cross-country analyses, we find 
stronger negative relation between political connections and IV in countries that are characterized poor 
institutional infrastructure, such as high corruption, less convenient access to external equity market, and 
weak media scrutiny. The prevalence of information-decreasing hypothesis in countries with weak 
institutions complements and expands the findings in the existing literature (see La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Haw, Hu, Hwang, & Wu, 2004; Dyck & Zingales, 2004; Bushman, 
Piotroski, & Smith, 2004). In contrast, we find that the relation between political connections and IV is 
not significant in countries with high level of institutional quality. Our findings are inconsistent with the 
information-decreasing hypothesis in these countries. Our empirical findings results are robust, after 
controlling for the effects of other factors that may affect IV (such as: earnings quality, analyst coverage, 
share turnover, and insider ownership) and to changes in specifications. 
Collectively, this study contributes to a deeper understanding on the implications of political 
connections. Our results advance the existing literature in several ways. First, we show that the stock 
prices of politically connected firms are less informative than for similar unconnected firms, especially 
when such connections are made to the controlling owner of the firm and if those firms are located 
countries with low institutional quality. This finding suggests lower transparency and greater rent-seeking 
through political connections in countries with low institutional quality. It is also supportive of the 
findings of related studies on the negative implications of establishing connections (such as Chen et al, 
2010; Chaney et al., 2011; Brockman et al., 2013; Boubakri et al., 2013). In contrast, we observe no 
relation between political connections and stock price informativeness in countries with high institutional 
quality. This implies that political connections in these countries are either coincidental or driven by non-
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rent-seeking motives.1 In particular, our finding suggests that the adverse effect of political connections 
on the information environment could be effectively counterbalanced by having strong and supportive 
market institutions.   
Second, we show that the negative relation between political connections and stock-price 
informativeness is incremental to the effects of earnings quality and analyst coverage. If we identify 
earnings quality and analyst coverage as measures of public information dissemination, our finding 
suggests that political connections weakens not only the public information environment but also stymies 
the acquisition and use of private information, especially for firms in countries characterized by low 
institutional quality.2  
Third, at a broader level, our findings contribute to the discussion in the literature on the effect of 
country-level institutions (Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003; Haw et al., 2004) and firm-level ownership 
and relationships (Morck, Yeung, & Yu, 2000; Ali, Chen, & Radhakrishnan, 2007) on governance of 
international firms. More relevantly, our findings are supportive of the notion that establishing political 
connections in countries with high levels of corruption could be detrimental to international business 
(Habib & Zurawski, 2002).   
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides the literature review and presents the 
hypotheses development. Section 3 describes our research design and sample data. Section 4 discusses the 
empirical results. Section 5 provides the concluding remarks. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Literature on Stock Price Informativeness 
We use non-synchronous stock price movements (idiosyncratic volatility, IV) to measure the degree of 
incorporation of firm-specific information into stock prices via trading (Roll, 1988). The use of IV as a 
proxy for the informativeness of stock prices is supported by extensive prior literature (Morck et al., 2000; 
Durnev, Morck, Yeung, & Zarowin, 2003; Jin & Myers, 2006; Ferreira & Laux, 2007). In particular, Jin 
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and Myers (2006) argue that any firm-specific stock price movement that is not explained by the market 
movement must be driven by firm-specific information that is available to the investors.  
Moreover, studies have also found that there are cross-country variations in the pattern of IV. For 
example, Morck et al. (2000) find that while firms in the developed markets exhibit higher IV than those 
in the emerging markets. They attribute poorer governance and more opaque accounting in emerging 
markets to explain this difference. In effect, they employ the differences in IV to proxy for the differences 
in the disclosure of firm-specific information. Their study further documents that country-level measure 
of opacity is negatively associated with IV.3   
Recent studies have also demonstrated the implications of IV on firms’ capital allocation decisions. 
Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) find that more informative stock prices (evidenced by higher IV) 
result in more value-increasing capital budgeting decisions (measured by the ratio of Tobin’s marginal q 
ratio). In a similar vein, Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) employ two measures of stock price 
informativeness: IV and probability of informed trading (PIN) and examine whether they are associated 
with changes in the sensitivity of investment to stock price. They show that firms with higher values of IV 
and PIN display higher investment-stock price sensitivities, which supports the notion that higher stock 
price informativeness is associated with higher investment efficiency.  
Firm-specific information derives from two sources: (i) direct public disclosures by the firm; and (ii) 
the acquisition of private information by interested investors and analysts. Ferreira and Laux (2007) argue 
that good governance helps in improving the information environment of the firm. On the one hand, good 
governance can improve the public disclosures such as earnings.4 On the other hand, good governance 
can also improve the access to private information by interested investors and analysts by reducing the 
marginal cost of collecting price-relevant firm-specific information.5  
The above arguments suggest that after controlling for public information such as earnings quality 
and analyst coverage, changes in IV are reflective of the private information collection effort by investors 
(Gul et al., 2011). Furthermore, private information gets reflected in stock prices through trading. Prior 
studies have found that private information is likely to be more speedily incorporated in firms with lower 
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trading volume (Chan & Hameed, 2006; Fernandes & Ferreira, 2008) and higher insider ownership 
(Piotroski & Roulstone, 2004). After controlling for these factors, any incremental effect of political 
connectedness on IV reflects a fundamental change in the private information environment.  
 
Hypothesis Development  
Recent literature has provided evidence on the benefits and drawbacks of political connections to firms 
around the world. Faccio (2006) documents that politically connected firms experience significant 
increase in stock prices after those connections are established. Boubakri, Guedhami, Mishra, and Saffar 
(2012) provide evidence that politically connected firms have lower cost of equity capital. Fernandes and 
Ferreira (2009) show a negative relation between stock price informativeness and cost of capital. These 
studies show that it is less risky for uninformed investors to invest in politically connected firms. There 
are two plausible reasons. In countries with weak institutions, political rent seeking increases the value of 
the firm and benefit investors more than the corresponding decrease in transparency. In countries with 
strong institutions where political rent seeking is not likely, political connections could provide greater 
knowledge of regulations and reduce transaction costs. Further, the connected firms are more likely to 
appoint Big Four auditors (Guedhami, Pittman, & Saffar, 2014) to signal their intention to be more 
transparent to outside investors. If these benefits in terms of higher value, lower risk and greater 
transparency outweigh the costs of potential rent seeking on average, it should translate to a positive 
association between political connections and stock price informativeness, which we term as the 
information-increasing hypothesis. The first part of our first hypothesis follows: 
Hypothesis 1a: The stock prices of politically connected firms are more informative than for their 
non-connected counterparts. 
On the other hand, the adverse effects of political rent seeking in connected firms could outweigh 
the advantages. Political rent-seeking is a process of self-interested opaque dealings between government 
officials and private businesses (Morck & Yeung, 2003; Krueger, 1974) in which the firm obtains 
favorable (not merited) treatments in various ways including getting government contracts or in bending 
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rules or in getting loans at a lower cost (Faccio, 2006).6 In order to protect its political rents and its 
connected political officials, firms could become more opaque about the political favors received. 
Furthermore, recent studies have also suggested that politically connected firms have lower earnings 
quality (Chaney et al., 2011) and auditors require higher audit fees for politically connected firms as there 
are higher tendencies for these firms to engage in financial misconducts (Gul, 2006). If, on average, these 
adverse effects of political connections on the information environment outweigh the potential advantages, 
we should expect a negative relation between political connection and IV. This leads to the information-
decreasing hypothesis. The second part of our first hypothesis follows: 
Hypothesis 1b: The stock prices of politically connected firms are less informative than for their 
non-connected counterparts.  
Our next hypothesis is about the effect of cross-country institutional differences on the relation 
between political connections and IV. Our hypothesis is based on recent literature (Ball, Kothari, & Robin 
2000; Ball, Robin, & Wu 2003) that suggests the country’s institutional infrastructure could influence 
their reporting and disclosure decisions. In particular, we expect the association between political 
connections and stock price informativeness to differ across countries for the following reasons. 
Businesses are dependent for their project initiations and sustenance on the availability and affordability 
of capital and other resources on the cost side, and their ability to penetrate the markets on the revenue 
side. Countries with strong legal and extra-legal institutions demand transparency and penalize political 
rent seeking.  The strong enforcement of regulations in these countries make the potential cost of political 
rent-seeking high both for the firm and for the connected individuals because of the fear of reputation loss 
arising from the scrutiny and exposure by free media and the fear of litigation and the political backlash 
against the concerned politician when such favoritism is exposed. In these countries, private financial 
institutions and individuals make investment decisions without restrictions by the state. They are more 
likely to provide capital to transparent firms where they can discern better the use of their capital than to 
provide capital to opaque firms. Therefore, businesses strive to attract capital by creating transparent 
information environments that instill confidence among the investors. Likewise, businesses are mostly 
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free to sell their output in free markets with no direct state intervention. In these countries, political rent 
seeking is not feasible and firms seek political connections either coincidentally or for reducing 
transaction costs.  
In contrast, countries with low institutional quality are characterized by more state control or/and 
intervention both in the resource and product markets. When the state has significant control over the 
capital and other resources, firms either choose to attract capital from private investors by creating 
transparent information environments or alternatively, access the capital through political connections and 
government influence. Under these circumstances, the managers of politically connected firms have both 
the opportunity and the incentive to be less forthcoming in their public disclosures and also make it 
difficult for interested investors and analysts to obtain private information. Even in countries that have 
market-friendly statutes on their books, the market forces could be ineffective because of corruption, 
inconvenient access to external equity market, and the lack of scrutiny by the media.  Therefore, we 
expect politically connected firms to exhibit lower transparency (the stock prices are less informative) 
than their non-connected peers. 
These differences in the effects of institutional strength on the relation between political 
connections and IV suggest that if the information-increasing hypothesis prevails, the positive effect of 
connections on the information environment should be stronger but if the information-decreasing 
hypothesis prevails, the negative effect should be stronger for countries with weak institutions.  We state 
our second hypothesis in two parts, conditional on whether the information increasing or the information 
decreasing hypothesis prevails. 
Hypothesis 2a: The positive relation between political connections and stock price informativeness 
is stronger in countries with high institutional quality (i.e. low corruption, high access to external equity 
market, and high media penetration). 
The second part of our second hypothesis follows: 
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Hypothesis 2b:  The negative relation between political connections and stock price 
informativeness is stronger in countries with low institutional quality (i.e. high corruption, low access to 
external equity market, and low media penetration).  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA 
Measure of Idiosyncratic Volatility 
The dependent variable, IV, is the relative residual volatility in stock returns after controlling for common 
factors or market returns that are sources of systematic risk. We measure IV on an annual basis using a 
two-factor international model (Morck et al., 2000; Li, Morck, Yang, & Yeung, 2004; Jin & Myers, 2006; 
Fernandes & Ferreira, 2008) that includes both the local and the U.S. market index returns as follows: 
tjtUSjtmjtUSjtmjtUStmjjtj errrrrrr ,1,,61,,51,,41,,3,2,,1,            
(1) 
In equation (1),  
tjr , is the weekly stock return for firm j;  tmr ,  is the weekly value-weighted 
domestic market index return for the country of stock listing. The variable 
tUSr ,  is the weekly value-
weighted U.S. market index return. Following Jin and Myers (2006) and Hutton et al. (2009), we include 
the one-week lead and lag returns for both the domestic ),( 1,1,  tmtm rr and U.S. market returns 
),( 1,1,  tUStUS rr to control for non-synchronous trading (Dimson, 1979).  
 The estimated annual variance of the residual term 
2^
, jetje   is our estimate of the absolute 
firm-specific return variation 
2
je  . The ratio of idiosyncratic volatility to total volatility is 2
2
j
je


 , which is 
essentially 
21 R of equation (1). Since 2R is bounded between 0 and 1, we follow the existing literature 
in computing IV as the log-transformed relative firm-specific return variation where our estimate 
2^
je  
replaces
2
je : 
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Data and the Sample 
Our data on the political connections for firms around the world is obtained from Faccio (2006).7 
Consistent with Faccio (2006), we define a firm as politically connected if an individual who holds more 
than 10% of the shares or who is a member of the board of directors of the firm is also in the position of 
leadership in the country as king, president or prime minster (top politician), is a member of parliament, 
or is closely related to a top politician.  
We use a dummy variable, CONNECTED, which equals 1 for politically connected firms, or 0 
otherwise. We retrieve the firm-level financial data for the international firms from Worldscope and 
Datastream, both provided by Thomson Reuters. We follow previous studies by excluding firms operating 
in the financial industry (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) because financial industry disclosures are 
regulated differently among different countries. We also eliminate firms with book values of total assets 
of less than US$10 million to make the firms more comparable across different countries as well as 
industries with no connected firms. Further, we require the weekly returns for the sample firms to be 
available to compute IV. With these constraints, we obtain a sample of 6,453 (32,464) non-connected 
firms (firm-years) and 224 (1,621) connected firms (firm-years) that gives a total sample of 6,677 (34,085) 
firms (firm-years).  The sample period is from 1997 to 2005. The detailed distribution of the sample and 
the corresponding median IV for each country are presented in Table 1. 
 [INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
As observed from panel A of Table 1, there is a significant and consistent difference in IV between 
connected and non-connected firms, with connected firms displaying lower IV in 20 out of the 28 
countries in our international sample.8 This finding provides a preliminary indication that political 
connections might be associated with lower firm-specific idiosyncratic volatility.   
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In addition, Table 1 presents three other country-level institutional variables that we employ in the 
empirical tests to examine the cross-sectional variations of the relation between political connections and 
idiosyncratic volatility. We measure the degree of corruption in a country using the corruption index 
(CORRUPT) developed in Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003). Specifically, it measures “the 
exercise of public power for private gain” in the year 2000 and incorporates various facets of corruption, 
including bribery and the impact of corruption. A lower index value reflects higher corruption. 
CORRUPT values range from -1.09 (Indonesia) to 2.54 (Finland). The overall mean value of CORRUPT 
is 1.36.  
We identify the extent of access to external equity market in a country by the ACCESS index, 
obtained from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006). A higher score on the ACCESS index 
indicates a more convenient access to the equity market and therefore, the cost associated with raising 
external equity is lower. ACCESS values range from 3.90 (Mexico) to 6.74 (USA), with an overall mean 
value of 5.46 
We obtain our media penetration index (MEDIA) from Bushman et al. (2004). It is defined as the 
average rank of the country’s per capita number of newspapers and televisions during 1993 to 1995 as 
reported by World Development Indicators (WDI) database, published by the World Bank.9 This index is 
only available for 26 out of the 28 countries in our sample. Higher index values represent higher media 
penetration. MEDIA ranges from 29.51 (India) to 96.72 (USA) and the overall mean value is 80.00.  
Panel A of Table 2 gives the descriptive statistics for firm-specific variables for all firms as well as 
for connected and non-connected firms separately. The mean, median, and standard deviation of IV are 
1.020, 1.006, and 0.816, respectively. A comparison of the mean values of IV between connected and 
non-connected firms shows that the connected firms have a mean value of IV (mean = 0.577) that is about 
half of the respective mean value in non-connected firms (mean = 1.042) and the difference is significant 
at the 1 percent level. The medians also follow the same pattern.  
We include several firm-level control variables that affect IV, based on prior literature (Fernandes 
& Ferreira, 2008). SIZE is our proxy for firm size and it is the natural logarithm of total assets (in US 
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dollars).  LEV is the firm’s leverage, and it is calculated as total debts divided by total assets. The return 
on equity ROE, is our profitability measure, computed as net income divided by the ending value of the 
book value of equity. The book-to-market ratio, BTM, is the computed as book value of equity divided by 
market value of equity. Panel A of Table 2 reveals that connected firms are on average larger in SIZE; 
have higher LEV and ROE; and have smaller BTM than non-connected firms. Most of these findings are 
consistent with that found in Faccio (2010). 
 [INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
We also include several country-level control variables that prior studies (Morck et al., 2000; Jin & 
Myers, 2006) have found to be important in influencing IV. GOVDISC is an index of governance and 
disclosure that is created by taking the principal components of the good government index based on La 
Porta et al. (1998),10 accounting disclosure index from the Global Competitiveness Reports for 1999 and 
2000 (Jin & Myers, 2006), and the rule of law index  (La Porta et al., 2006). We use two measures to 
proxy for firm and industry concentration: FIRM_HERF is the firm Herfindahl index, computed by using 
the sales of individual firms for each country; and IND_HERF is the industry Herfindahl index, computed 
by using the industry sales for each country. GDP is the natural logarithm of gross domestic product per 
capita and VGDP is the variance of the annual GDP per capita growth, both obtained from the World 
Bank WDI database. NFIRMS is the natural logarithm of the number of listed firms in each country in 
each year. Finally, CSIZE is the size of the country, measured as the natural logarithm of the geographic 
size in square kilometers.  
Panel B of Table 2 displays the Pearson’s correlations between IV, the political connections 
dummy variable (CONNECTED), and other firm-level control variable. Notably, the preliminary reading 
from the correlation analysis reveals that IV is negatively correlated with CONNECTED. The values of 
correlation coefficients between political connections and control variables also indicate that 
multicollinearity is unlikely to be a serious problem for our analysis.  
Appendix 1 provides the detailed definition for each variable. 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The Effect of Political Connections on Idiosyncratic Volatility 
Table 3 presents the results of the regression with IV as the dependent variable and political 
connections denoted by CONNECTED as the main independent variable. In particular, we estimate the 
following baseline regression using ordinary least squares (OLS) specification: 
i
t
it
k
ik
j
ijtitititiiti
uYeareCountryd
IndustrycROEBTMLEVSIZECONNECTEDaIV

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
,5,4,3,210, 
                 (3)                                                                     
In equation (3), 
tiIV , is the idiosyncratic volatility of firm i in year t and CONNECTED  is an indicator 
variable that is equal to 1 if firm i is a politically connected firm, or 0 otherwise. Industry, Country, and 
Year are dummy variables that control for country, industry, and year fixed effects. All other variables are 
as defined earlier. 
The results of our estimate of the baseline model (equation (3)) using only country and industry 
fixed effects (FE) are presented in Model (1) of Table 3.11 We also control for heteroskedasticity and 
serial-correlation by using standard errors that are clustered by firm.12 The specification for Model (2) 
includes additional year dummies. Model (3) presents the results for the modified regression specification 
that include all the country-level control variables13: 
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where CountryControls refer to country-level control variables that are based on prior studies (Morck et 
al., 2000; Jin & Myers, 2006; Fernandes & Ferreira, 2008; Fernandes & Ferreira, 2009): GOVDISC 
(governance disclosure index), FIRMHERF (firm Herfindahl index), INDHERF (industry Herfindahl 
index), GDP (GDP per capita), VGDP (variance of GDP per capita), NFIRMS (number of listed firms in 
each country in each year), and CSIZE (country size). Model (4) presents the results of the Fama-
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MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression analysis and Model (5) presents the results of weighted least 
squares (WLS) specification to take into account the different number of observations in each country.  
 [INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
The results in Table 3 show that the coefficient of CONNECTED is significantly negative at least at 
the 5% level for all the specifications, indicating that that politically connected firms, generally display 
lower IV when compared to similar non-connected firms. The results are not only statistically significant, 
but also economically significant. Using the coefficient estimate in Model (3) of Table 4, political 
connections result in lower IV value by 6.7 percentage points, which is about 11.6% of the average value 
of IV across all politically connected firms. Therefore, our findings are supportive of Hypothesis 1b 
(information-decreasing hypothesis) that, on average, the stock prices of politically connected firms are 
less informative than non-connected firms. 14 Correspondingly, Hypothesis 1a is not supported. 
Consistent with prior studies and our expectations, country-level variables GDP and GOVDISC 
exhibit positive associations with IV, indicating that higher economic growth (in terms of GDP per capita) 
and more effective country-level governance and disclosures facilitate the acquisition of firm-specific 
information by investors (Jin & Myers, 2006; Ferreira & Laux, 2007; Hutton et al, 2009). The findings for 
the other firm-specific control variables reveal that while LEV and BTM are positively related to IV, SIZE 
has a negative relation with IV. Meanwhile, there is no consistent relation between ROE and IV. The 
firm-level competition variable, FIRM_HERF shows a positive relation with IV, but the industry-level 
competition variable IND_HERF displays no significant association with IV in any of the regression 
specification. Finally, we also find that CSIZE is positively associated with IV.   
 
Robustness Tests 
Matched-sample test 
In this sub-section, we present several robustness tests on the effect of political connections on IV. First, 
we construct a matching sample of connected and non-connected firms. In essence, for each politically 
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connected firm in each year, we find a corresponding non-connected firm which fulfills the following 
criteria: (1) the non-connected matching firm must be located in the same country and industry; (2) the 
market capitalization of the non-connected matching firm must be similar to the value for the connected 
firm. The matching is performed without replacement, which implies that each connected firm is 
distinctly matched with a corresponding non-connected firm. The total number of firm-year observations 
for the matching sample is 2,882. We re-estimate equations (3) and (4) for the matching sample using 
different regression specifications and present results in Table 4. Although the results are in general 
weaker for the matching sample, they are still consistent with Hypothesis 1b. Hence, the main finding of a 
negative relationship between political connections and IV still persists, even for the smaller matching 
sample. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Alternative specifications and samples 
Second, we use alternative regression specifications and other subsamples and present the results in Table 
5.  Model (1) presents the results after all the independent variables have been adjusted by the country 
median values; Model (2) includes the variability of ROE (denoted VROE) as an additional control 
variable; Model (3) excludes the data from the USA, UK, and Japan as these three countries constitute a 
disproportionately large number of unconnected firms compared to other countries; Model (4) excludes 
the Asian financial crisis period (1997-1998); Model (5) excludes all countries whose connected firms 
number less than 5. The results from all these additional tests are similar to the results in Table 3 and 
provide further confirmatory evidence in support of Hypothesis 1b that political connections exert a 
negative impact on IV.  
 [INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
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Different types of connections 
Next, we focus on different types of connections. Political connections are characterized both by the 
political official with whom the firm is connected and the position he or she holds in the firm. Controlling 
shareholders have the incentive to derive maximum benefit from the political connections that they help 
to establish for their firms.15 This type of connections is denoted by the dummy variable, 
CONNECTED_OWNER, which equals 1 if the political connections are established through the 
controlling shareholder, or 0 otherwise. Similarly, CONNECTED_DIR is a dummy variable which equals 
1 if the connections are established through a member of the board of directors, or 0 otherwise.  
The leader of the country (such as the king or president) is in the best position to bestow political 
favors with little fear of being penalized by the legal system for favoritism. Connections to the country 
leader is denoted by the dummy variable, CONNECTED_LEADER which equals 1 if the controlling 
shareholder or a member of the board of directors is the head of state such as a king, president, or prime 
minister of the country, or 0 otherwise. Likewise, CONNECTED_MP is a dummy variable which equals 1 
if the controlling shareholder or a member of the board of directors is a member of the parliament, or 0 
otherwise. CONNECTED_CLOSE is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the controlling shareholder or a 
member of the board of directors is closely related to at least one top politician, or 0 otherwise. 
We replace CONNECTED in equation (4) with the various types of connections and re-estimate 
equation (4) using OLS with industry and year fixed-effects. Model (1) of Table 6 present the results 
when CONNECTED is replaced by CONNECTED_OWNER and CONNECTED_DIR; whereas Model (2) 
of Table 6 present the corresponding results when CONNECTED is replaced by CONNECTED_LEADER, 
CONNECTED_MP, and CONNECTED_CLOSE.  The results suggest that the channel through which our 
main result on the negative effect of political connections on stock price informativeness is obtained is 
through the controlling shareholders that are politically connected (CONNECTED_OWNER), as the 
coefficient CONNECTED_OWNER is negative (magnitude = -0.132) and significant at the 1% level. 
Another connection that could potentially be important is when the connected politician is the leader of 
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the country (CONNECTED_LEADER) in question, as the coefficient CONNECTED_LEADER is also 
negative (with a p-value of 0.14). The other types of political connections are not significant.  
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Endogeneity mitigation tests 
In order to mitigate the concerns about endogeneity and self-selection bias associated with the decision of 
firms to establish political connections, we employ a two-stage treatment model. In the first-stage, we 
estimate a probit model with the dummy variable, CONNECTED, as the dependent variable and several 
firm-specific and country-specific variables that prior studies have included as determinants of political 
connection:  
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In particular, we use PCONNIND, which is the percentage of politically connected firms for each industry 
in each year as an instrument in the first-stage regression as we would expect that a higher percentage 
leads to more establishments of political connections (see Houston, Jiang, Lin, & Ma, 2014). On the other 
hand, there is no reason to expect that it will affect IV, hence satisfying the conditions required for the 
instrument (Reeb, Sakakibara, & Mahmood, 2012). The results of the first-stage regression (unreported) 
reveals that firms are more likely to establish political connections if they are larger (coefficient of SIZE = 
0.210, t-statistics = 9.04), located in countries with low governance and accounting disclosures 
(coefficient of GOVDISC = -0.111, t-statistics = -2.49), and if they belong to industries that contain larger 
proportion of connected firms (coefficient of PCONNIND = 5.355, t-statistics = 11.05).  
Then, in the second stage, we obtain the predicted value of CONNECTED and the inverse mills 
ratio (IMR) from the first-stage regression of equation (5) and include them to re-estimate equation (4). 
Models (3) and (4) of Table 6 present the corresponding results for the two-stage least squares (2SLS) and 
the Heckman (1979) specifications. Our main result remains unchanged as the predicted values of 
CONNECTED still display negative association with IV.  
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The Role of Country-Level Institutional Infrastructure 
In order to test Hypothesis 2 on the differential effects of country-level institutional infrastructure 
on the relation between political connections and stock price informativeness, we employ three proxies 
for country-level institutional factor, namely: CORRUPT, ACCESS, and MEDIA. We use the median 
value of each country-level variable to partition the sample into two groups: Low (below median value) 
and High (above median value).  
 
Effect of corruption 
Models (1) and (2) of Table 7 provide the regression estimates of equation (4) using OLS with industry 
and year fixed effects for low and high corruption countries. Interestingly, we observe that the presence of 
political connections has no incremental effect on IV for firms in countries with low level of corruption 
(the magnitude of the coefficient of CONNECTED in Model (1) is 0.032 and it is insignificant). In 
contrast, there is a negative and significant association between political connections and IV for firms in 
countries with high level of corruption (the magnitude of the coefficient of CONNECTED in Model (2) is 
-0.100, with t-statistic of 2.68). In terms of economic significance, for firms located in countries with high 
levels of corruption, political connections have the effect of reducing the value of IV by 10 percentage 
points or about 17.3% of the average value of IV across all politically connected firms. These findings 
suggest that political connections exert a differential impact on IV, depending on the strength of the 
institutional quality.   
Next, we construct a dummy variable LOWINST, which equals 1 for firms in corrupted countries, 
those in countries with low access to external equity market, and those in countries with low media 
penetration; or 0 otherwise. We include the interaction term CONNECTED×LOWINST and estimate the 
following equation using OLS with industry and year fixed effects: 
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Model (3) of Table 7 presents the results of estimates of equation (6) for the pooled sample that 
controls for the interaction between CONNECTED and LOWINST, using CORRUPT as the measure of 
institutional quality. We observe that once LOWINST and its interaction with CONNECTED are 
controlled for, the coefficient of CONNECTED is no longer significant. However, consistent with our 
prediction in Hypothesis 2b, the coefficient of LOWINST exhibits a negative relation with IV. More 
relevantly, the coefficient of the interaction term CONNECTED×LOWINST is negative and significant at 
the 5% level (magnitude = -0.121, t-statistic = -2.34) and this interaction term captures the differential 
impact of political connections on IV for firms in countries with low institutional quality, relative to their 
counterparts in countries with high institutional quality. 
  [INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
Effect of access to capital markets 
We examine the split-sample results in Models (4) and (5); and the interaction results in Model (6) 
for access to external equity market (ACCESS). The results demonstrate that the significant negative 
association between political connections and IV is found only in countries with low access to external 
equity market (Model (4)). In all other cases, the coefficient of CONNECTED is insignificant. In addition, 
we continue to find that the coefficient of the interaction term CONNECTED×LOWINST is negative and 
statistically significant (Model (6)).   
 
Effect of media penetration 
Models (7) to (9) of Table 7 present the results for media penetration, the first two for the split 
samples and the last one for interaction effect. The negative effect of political connections on IV is 
significant only in the countries with low media penetration ((Model (7)). The estimation of equation (6) 
using MEDIA as the measure of institutional quality further shows that the coefficient of the interaction 
term CONNECTED×LOWINST is negative and significant ((Model (9)).  
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In general, the evidence in Table 7 is consistent with the hypothesis of more negative association 
between political connections and IV for firms in countries with low institutional quality, characterized by 
high corruption, low access to external equity market, or low media penetration. Hence, the results in 
Table 7 provide supporting evidence for Hypothesis 2b. 
 
Controlling for Earnings Quality, Analyst Coverage, Trading Volume and Insider Ownership 
In this sub-section, we examine potential alternative explanations for the result that political 
connections exert a negative impact on stock price informativeness in countries with low institutional 
quality. First, we test whether our finding is in addition to or merely a substitute for the effect of earnings 
quality on IV as studied by Jin and Myer (2006) and Hutton et al. (2009). These prior studies show that 
both country-level and firm-level measures of earnings opacity dampen the incorporation of firm-specific 
information in stock prices. Moreover, Chaney et al. (2011) further show that politically connected firms 
exhibit lower quality accounting information.  
Following Ashbaugh, LaFond, & Mayhew (2003), we compute earnings quality (EQ) as the ROA-
adjusted discretionary current accruals.16 The rationale for using this measure is that managers of 
connected firms who are motivated to engage in political rent-seeking are likely to use their discretion in 
accounting policy to reduce the informativeness of earnings. There is no reason to believe that non-
discretionary aspects of earnings quality are systematically different between connected and non-
connected firms after controlling for variables such as size, leverage, profitability and growth. Therefore, 
consistent with prior studies, we treat higher values of EQ to indicate higher incidence of earnings 
manipulation undertaken by managers, which therefore implies lower earnings quality.  
We modify equation (6) to include two additional explanatory variables: EQ and the interaction 
term CONNECTED×EQ and re-estimate the expanded equation using OLS with industry and year fixed-
effects.  The results (when CORRUPT is used as the measure of institutional quality) are presented in 
Model (1) of Table 8. Similar to the findings by Hutton et al. (2009), we show that EQ is negatively 
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associated with IV, which suggest that higher level of accruals are representative of less transparency and 
results in stock price which do not fully reflect firm-specific information. If our earlier results are simply 
due to the effect of earnings quality, then, we should expect the interaction term 
CONNECTED×CORRUPT to be insignificant once we include the other interaction term 
CONNECTED×EQ into the regression. However, this is contrary to the findings in Model (1). The 
interaction coefficient CONNECTED×CORRUPT continues to display negative sign (-0.286) and it 
remains highly significant at the five-percent level (t-statistic = -2.21). More importantly, we do not find 
any relation between the interaction term CONNECTED×EQ with IV. Therefore, our results show that 
political connections have an incremental negative effect on IV, after controlling for the effect of earnings 
quality.  
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
Second, Chan and Hameed (2006) document a negative relationship between analyst coverage and 
IV for firms in the emerging markets. They infer from their findings that increased analyst activities may 
impede the production of firm-specific information, resulting in stock prices becoming less informative. 
To examine whether our main finding is driven by analyst coverage, we control for ANALYST, which is 
calculated as the logarithm of 1 plus the number of analysts following the firm, as obtained from 
I/B/E/S.17 We further include ANALYST and the interaction term CONNECTED×ANALYST in the 
estimation of equation (6) using OLS with industry and year fixed-effects. Model (2) of Table 8 shows 
that analyst coverage is negatively and significantly associated with IV, which is supportive of the 
findings of Chan and Hameed (2006). We also find that the interaction coefficient 
CONNECTED×ANALYST is negative but not significant. More relevantly, our main finding on the 
interaction coefficient CONNECTED×CORRUPT remains unchanged, even after controlling for the 
effect of analyst coverage. 
Third, prior literature (Ferreira & Laux, 2007) has also documented the “trading link” hypothesis, 
which posits that the private information collected by the sophisticated investors and analysts gets 
incorporated into the stock price through informed trading. Therefore, the more trades by informed 
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investors, the higher should be the firm-specific information incorporated into the stock price. Ideally, we 
would like to control for informed trades to see if the effect of political connections on IV is linked to (the 
lack of) such trading. However, specific institutional (informed) trading information is not available for 
the countries that are covered in our sample. Particularly, we do not have information about such trading 
in emerging economies. As the second best approximation, we use share turnover (TURNOVER), 
computed as total annual trading volume divided by total number of shares outstanding (as obtained from 
Datastream) to control for the trading link effect. Our rationale is that higher turnover reflects greater 
heterogeneity among investors and therefore proxies for the presence of informed traders. Based on this 
rationale, a lower turnover should result in lower firm-specific volatility. We include the additional 
control variables TURNOVER and the interaction term CONNECTED×TURNOVER in our estimation of 
equation (6) using OLS with industry and year fixed effects. The results of the regression, presented in 
Model (3) of Table 8 show that the main results of our study are unaltered. In addition, the coefficient of 
TURNOVER exhibits negative association with IV, which is consistent with Chan and Hameed (2006) and 
Fernandes and Ferreira (2008). Both studies argue that the stock prices of highly traded stocks incorporate 
less firm-specific information and therefore, they are less informative. The interaction coefficient 
CONNECTED×TURNOVER is not related to IV. 
In Model (4) of Table 8, we provide the results after controlling for the effect of insider ownership 
on IV. We obtain ownership data from Worldscope and measure insider ownership by the variable 
CLOSE.  This variable is defined as the percentage of shares owned by senior corporate officers and 
directors and their immediate families; shares held in trusts; shares held by another corporation (except 
shares in a fiduciary capacity by financial institutions); shares held by pension and benefit plans; and 
shares held by individuals who hold 5% or more ownership. We include CLOSE and the interaction term 
CONNECTED×CLOSE in the estimation of equation (6) using OLS with industry and year fixed-effects. 
The coefficient of CLOSE in Model (4) is positive and statistically significant at the one-percent level, 
similar to the findings of Piotroski and Roulstone (2004). This implies that insider ownership fosters the 
incorporation of firm-specific information into stock prices. However, the interaction coefficient of 
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CONNECTED×CLOSE does not exhibit any association with IV. Nevertheless, our main finding on the 
interaction coefficient CONNECTED×CORRUPT remains unchanged after controlling for the effect of 
insider ownership. 
In summary, the findings in Table 8 provide consistent evidence that the stock prices of politically 
connected firms reflect less firm-specific information than that of non-connected firms in countries with 
low institutional quality. More importantly, since we control for measures of public information 
environment such as earnings quality and analyst coverage, these findings also imply that political 
connections have the effect of weakening not only the public information environment as documented in 
prior literature but also the private information environment. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we examine the differential cross-country effects of political connections on the 
incorporation of firm-specific information in the stock prices of firms, using an international sample that 
covers 28 countries. We propose two competing hypotheses on how political connections affect the 
information environment of international firms. When political connections are established to extract 
political rents, the information environment of the connected firms becomes poorer (information-
decreasing hypothesis). Whereas, when political connections are coincidental or established for expertise 
and cost reduction, they could strengthen the information environment (information-increasing 
hypothesis). We measure the strength of the information environment by the idiosyncratic stock price 
volatility (IV). Consistent with the information-decreasing hypothesis, we find that politically connected 
firms exhibit lower IV than that of their non-connected peers. In our examination of the effect of country-
level differences in institutional infrastructure, we find that weak institutions characterized by high 
corruption, low access to external equity market, and low media scrutiny exacerbate and in fact, drive the 
negative relation between political connections and the richness of the information environment. An 
implication of this result is that strong institutions alter the incentives that make firms seek political 
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connection and in turn, mitigate the adverse consequences of political rent seeking on the firm-specific 
information that becomes available to investors.  
Our study provides empirical evidence on the effects of macro-factors such as political factors, 
corruption, financial development, and media penetration on the information environment of connected 
vis-a-vis non-connected firms. By implication, our findings also provide evidence on the differential 
motivations for political connections for firms in countries with low and high institutional quality. In 
particular, our findings suggest that countries with low institutional quality more political rent-seeking 
activity because they have weaker restraining legal and political institutions. In contrast, countries with 
high institutional quality have strong restraining legal and political institutions that inhibit political rent-
seeking activity.  
Another related finding in our study is that not all political connections are similar. Political 
connections that involve the controlling shareholder or owner significantly affect IV, whereas other 
connections do not have such impact. This result lends support to the argument that political connections 
allow the connected firms to use their power in rent-extraction.  In effect, when the connections are 
between strong power centers (strong enough to overcome the institutions and suppress news about it) on 
both sides – the state and the firm, political patronage is dispensed and exploited. In the absence of such 
power, it becomes risky for the politician to dispense political patronage and for the firm to extract 
political rent. 
At a more detailed level, our study, in conjunction with Chaney et al. (2011), shows that political 
connections adversely affect both public and private information availability. Chaney et al. (2011) 
document the negative effect of political connections on the quality of publicly announced accounting 
earnings. Information environment is comprised of both the public disclosure and the private acquisition 
of information by resourceful and interested investors. We show that the negative relation between 
political connections and IV remains after controlling for public sources of information. Therefore, the 
findings from our study suggest that political connections have an adverse and material effect on private 
information collection.  
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Our findings are useful in understanding the interactions between the political and legal institutions, 
the incentive for seeking political connections and the possibility of political rent-seeking activities which 
are welfare-reducing from a societal viewpoint. However, our results should be interpreted with caution. 
As mentioned in the paper, the reverse causality cannot be fully ruled out – we try to address it by 
examining what happens when firms establish political connections. An equilibrium argument is that 
firms might rationally choose to be politically connected if that is more value-adding than improving the 
information environment to attract capital. This choice is more common in countries with low 
institutional quality where the “value-addition” to the firm by political connections can be higher than that 
in countries with high institutional quality where political patronage, when it gets to be known, could be 
costly both for the provider and receiver of that patronage.     
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Appendix 
 
Table A1   Definitions of variables and sources of data 
 
Variable name Definition Source 
Country-level institutional variables 
CORRUPT An index of corruption, measured as “the exercise of public power for 
private gain” in the year 2000. 
 
Kauffman et al. (2003) 
ACCESS An index of access to external equity market La Porta et al. (2006) 
 
MEDIA An index of media penetration, measured as the average rank of 
the countries’ per capital number of newspapers and television 
during 1993 and 1995. 
Bushman et al. (2004)  
Country-level control variables 
GOVDISC An index of governance and disclosure, measured as the principal 
components of the good government index from La Porta et al. (1998), 
accounting disclosure index from the Global Competitiveness Reports for 
1999 and 2000 (Jin and Myers, 2006), and the rule of law index (La Porta 
et al., 2006). 
 
La Porta et al. (1998); 
Jin and Myers (2006); La 
Porta et al. (2006) 
 
FIRMHERF Firm Herfindahl index, computed by using the sales of individual firms for 
each country. 
Worldscope 
INDHERF Industry Herfindahl index, computed by using the sales of individual firms 
for each country. 
Worldscope 
GDP Natural logarithm of gross domestic product. World Bank WDI 
VGDP Variance of the annual GDP per capita growth, estimated using the values 
over the previous 5 years. 
World Bank WDI 
NFIRMS The natural logarithm of the number of listed firms in each country and 
each year. 
Worldscope 
CSIZE Country size, measured as the natural logarithm of the geographic size in 
square kilometers. 
Fernandes and Ferreira 
(2008) 
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Firm-level variables 
IV Idiosyncratic volatility, calculated as the logarithmic transformation of (1- 
R2 / R2) from equation (1). 
Datastream 
   
SIZE Firm size, defined as the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. 
 
Worldscope 
LEV Leverage, defined as total debt scaled by the book value of total assets. 
 
Worldscope 
BTM Book-to-market ratio, calculated as the book value of total assets, divided 
by the market value of equity plus total assets minus the book value of total 
equity. 
  
Worldscope 
ROE Return on equity, calculated as net income divided by book value of total 
equity.  
 
Worldscope 
VROE Variability of return on equity, calculated over the previous 3 years. Worldscope 
   
EQ Inverse measure of earnings quality, calculated as the ROA-adjusted 
discretionary current accruals (Ashbaugh et al., 2005).  
 
Worldscope 
ANALYST Analyst following, calculated as the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number 
of analysts following the firms. Analyst following is set to 0 for firms with 
missing analyst data. 
 
I/B/E/S International 
TURNOVER Share turnover, calculated as total annual trading volume divided by total 
number of shares outstanding. 
 
Datastream 
CLOSE Closely-held ownership. Worldscope 
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Table 1   Sample distribution 
 All firms Non-connected firms Connected firms Country-level variables 
Country FIRMS N IV FIRMS N IV FIRMS N IV DIFF CORRUPT ACCESS MEDIA 
Australia 17 58 1.232 15 53 1.221 2 5 1.842 0.621 2.05 6.00 89.25 
Austria 26 109 1.009 25 102 0.968 1 7 1.421 0.453 1.93 4.89 87.53 
Belgium 5 25 0.269 3 12 0.176 2 13 0.812 0.636 1.36 5.70 86.73 
Canada 23 46 1.116 21 41 1.116 2 5 0.703 -0.414 2.3 6.39 93.37 
Denmark 34 125 1.178 31 105 1.178 3 20 1.184 0.006 2.36 5.87 95.52 
Finland 35 173 1.193 33 156 1.142 2 17 1.253 0.111 2.54 6.37 94.82 
France 214 1,083 1.087 209 1,041 1.094 5 42 1.026 -0.067 1.46 5.75 86.14 
Germany 77 270 1.331 75 259 1.331 2 11 1.645 0.314 1.72 5.93 90.99 
Hong Kong 55 270 1.170 54 260 1.172 1 10 0.653 -0.519 1.44 5.50 87.44 
India 174 1,002 0.620 170 965 0.620 4 37 0.654 0.034 -0.21 5.30 29.51 
Indonesia 146 701 0.932 126 580 0.952 20 121 0.700 -0.251 -1.09 4.53 . 
Ireland 7 51 0.942 6 41 1.004 1 10 0.942 -0.062 1.55 5.29 83.34 
Israel 50 188 0.956 48 170 1.017 2 18 -0.563 -1.580 1.25 5.35 82.47 
Italy 156 730 0.851 142 651 0.869 14 79 0.335 -0.534 0.89 4.41 78.98 
Japan 1,149 6,411 0.871 1,140 6,347 0.873 9 64 0.526 -0.348 1.38 4.92 91.79 
Korea (South) 194 961 0.827 189 925 0.838 5 36 0.496 -0.343 0.45 5.02 83.5 
Malaysia 644 3,291 0.796 598 2,929 0.832 46 362 0.282 -0.550 0.18 5.11 63.83 
Mexico 61 331 1.004 56 292 1.054 5 39 0.633 -0.421 -0.39 3.90 59.95 
Netherlands 28 56 0.768 27 54 0.682 1 2 1.046 0.365 2.34 6.43 92.00 
Portugal 34 134 1.068 32 122 1.068 2 12 0.894 -0.174 1.41 4.50 70.59 
Singapore 209 928 0.959 201 869 0.959 8 59 0.959 -0.001 2.5 5.50 83.72 
Spain 34 202 0.578 31 189 0.581 3 13 0.288 -0.294 1.66 5.09 75.31 
Sweden 68 396 0.607 65 375 0.613 3 21 0.483 -0.130 2.48 6.15 37.86 
Switzerland 31 213 0.877 28 185 0.936 3 28 0.576 -0.360 2.22 6.07 95.47 
Taiwan 418 1,862 0.899 413 1,817 0.903 5 45 0.152 -0.751 0.72 5.54 . 
Thailand 212 1,026 0.853 197 914 0.888 15 112 0.056 -0.832 -0.34 4.24 52.26 
UK 831 4,548 1.206 780 4,175 1.219 51 373 1.039 -0.180 2.17 6.26 90.81 
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USA 1,745 8,895 1.623 1,738 8,835 1.626 7 60 1.051 -0.575 1.77 6.74 96.72 
All markets              
Total 6,677 34,085  6,453 32,464  224 1,621      
Mean   0.958   0.962   0.753 -0.209 1.36 5.46 80.00 
This table presents the median logistic-transformed idiosyncratic volatility (IV) for the politically connected and non-connected firms as well as the three 
country-level institutional factors (CORRUPT, ACCESS, and MEDIA) for each country in the sample, respectively. IV is the logistic-transformed firm-specific 
return variation. FIRMS is the number of firms, N is the number of firm-years observations. DIFF is the difference in IV between connected and non-connected 
firms. All other variables are as defined in the Appendix. The sample period is from 1997 to 2005. 
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Table 2  Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the firm-specific variables 
 All firms Non-connected firms Connected firms  
 N Mean Median Std Dev N Mean Median Std Dev N Mean Median Std Dev p-value 
IV 34,085 1.020 1.006 0.816 32,464 1.042 1.025 0.811 1,621 0.577 0.579 0.808 (0.00) 
SIZE 34,085 19.340 19.160 1.697 32,464 19.283 19.110 1.667 1,621 20.483 20.430 1.865 (0.00) 
LEV 34,085 0.255 0.221 0.244 32,464 0.252 0.217 0.243 1,621 0.321 0.293 0.259 (0.00) 
BTM 34,085 0.990 0.706 0.914 32,464 0.993 0.710 2.714 1,621 0.936 0.648 2.666 (0.02) 
ROE 34,085 -0.023 0.064 0.442 32,464 -0.025 0.062 0.442 1,621 0.014 0.096 0.450 (0.00) 
Panel B: Correlation matrix for the firm-specific variables 
 IV CONNECTED SIZE LEV BTM ROE 
IV 1.000      
CONNECTED -0.121 1.000     
SIZE -0.346 0.151 1.000    
LEV -0.081 0.060 0.210 1.000   
BTM -0.018 -0.013 -0.113 0.055 1.000  
ROE -0.095 0.019 0.185 -0.074 -0.021 1.000 
Panel A of this table present the descriptive statistics of the main firm-specific variables. Panel B presents the Pearson correlations of the firm-specific 
variables. p-value for the differences in mean between connected and non-connected firms for each of the firm-specific variables is given in the 
parenthesis. All variables are as defined in the Appendix.  
35 
 
Table 3   Regression results of firm-specific return variation on political connections – Full sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 OLS OLS OLS Fama-Macbeth WLS 
CONNECTED -0.078*** -0.064** -0.067** -0.042** -0.067*** 
 (-2.95) (-2.44) (-2.37) (-2.52) (-3.75) 
SIZE -0.189*** -0.188*** -0.187*** -0.173*** -0.187*** 
 (-60.60) (-60.19) (-57.36) (-10.22) (-77.48) 
LEV 0.175*** 0.177*** 0.174*** 0.204*** 0.174*** 
 (8.94) (9.13) (8.68) (8.81) (10.89) 
BTM 0.069*** 0.080*** 0.064*** 0.067*** 0.064*** 
 (13.41) (15.26) (11.76) (7.77) (14.19) 
ROE 0.018* 0.007 0.001 -0.025* 0.001 
 (1.90) (0.79) (0.15) (-2.16) (0.15) 
GOVDISC   0.127*** 0.143*** 0.127*** 
   (7.81) (3.81) (10.73) 
FIRMHERF   4.907*** 4.599*** 4.879*** 
   (15.86) (4.85) (19.53) 
INDHERF   -0.078 0.126 -0.081 
   (-1.03) (1.58) (-1.57) 
GDP   0.174*** 0.164*** 0.175*** 
   (13.21) (5.04) (18.69) 
VGDP   0.137*** 0.086 0.136*** 
   (13.92) (1.55) (18.25) 
NFIRMS   0.083*** 0.079 0.082*** 
   (6.17) (1.53) (8.57) 
CSIZE   0.106*** 0.110*** 0.106*** 
   (26.56) (8.85) (38.70) 
Intercept 4.494*** 4.294*** 0.027 0.429 0.372*** 
 (35.24) (33.81) (0.15) (0.68) (2.78) 
Country FE Yes Yes No No No 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.315 0.346 0.321 0.280 0.278 
Observations 34,085 34,085 34,085 34,085 34,085 
This table presents the regression results of idiosyncratic volatility on political connections and other control 
variables for the full sample. The definitions of the variables are described in Appendix 1. The sample period is from 
1997-2005. Models (1) to (3) present the results using the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression specification. 
Model (4) presents the results using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression methodology. Model (5) presents the 
results using the weighted-least squares (WLS) regression methodology. The t-statistic for each coefficient is 
reported in the parenthesis and is based on White’s heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively (one-tailed). 
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Table 4   Regression results of firm-specific return variation on political connections – Matching sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 OLS OLS OLS Fama-Macbeth WLS 
CONNECTED -0.065** -0.063** -0.062* -0.069*** -0.062** 
 (-2.07) (-2.02) (-1.79) (-4.09) (-2.47) 
SIZE -0.182*** -0.187*** -0.190*** -0.182*** -0.190*** 
 (-13.04) (-13.04) (-13.15) (-11.75) (-19.09) 
LEV 0.096 0.183*** 0.206*** 0.246** 0.206*** 
 (1.39) (2.77) (2.94) (3.20) (3.69) 
BTM 0.029* 0.047*** 0.045** 0.039** 0.045*** 
 (1.65) (2.80) (2.52) (2.77) (3.01) 
ROE 0.004 -0.015 -0.006 -0.046 -0.006 
 (0.11) (-0.47) (-0.18) (-1.00) (-0.19) 
GOVDISC   0.095* 0.122** 0.095** 
   (1.86) (2.73) (2.56) 
FIRMHERF   3.733*** 6.336*** 3.733*** 
   (4.06) (3.40) (4.76) 
INDHERF   -0.005 0.126 -0.004 
   (-0.03) (1.20) (-0.03) 
GDP   0.196*** 0.192*** 0.196*** 
   (4.58) (4.52) (6.23) 
VGDP   -0.000 0.055 -0.000 
   (-0.01) (0.73) (-0.01) 
NFIRMS   0.046 0.072 0.046 
   (1.19) (1.32) (1.56) 
CSIZE   0.091*** 0.099*** 0.091*** 
   (5.60) (6.51) (8.10) 
Intercept 4.681*** 5.211*** 1.113* 0.502 0.580 
 (12.91) (14.06) (1.78) (0.64) (1.28) 
Country FE Yes Yes No No No 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.267 0.335 0.286 0.217 0.286 
Observations 2,882 2,882 2,882 2,882 2,882 
This table presents the regression results of idiosyncratic volatility on political connections and other control 
variables for the sample of politically connected firms and a matching sample of non-connected firms. The 
definitions of the variables are described in Appendix 1. The sample period is from 1997-2005. Models (1) to (3) 
present the results using the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression specification. Model (4) presents the results 
using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression methodology. Model (5) presents the results using the weighted-least 
squares (WLS) regression methodology. The t-statistic for each coefficient is reported in the parenthesis and is based 
on White’s heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1% levels, respectively (one-tailed). 
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Table 5   Regression results of firm-specific return variation on political connections – Alternative specifications 
and samples 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Adjusted for 
country median 
Include 
VROE 
Exclude 
USA, UK, 
Japan 
Exclude 
1997-1998 
# of connected 
firms > 5 
CONNECTED -0.060** -0.067** -0.057* -0.060** -0.078** 
 (-2.24) (-2.36) (-1.72) (-2.07) (-2.52) 
SIZE -0.186*** -0.188*** -0.184*** -0.185*** -0.186*** 
 (-60.67) (-56.32) (-34.14) (-54.20) (-54.32) 
LEV 0.050 0.175*** 0.149*** 0.210*** 0.172*** 
 (0.29) (8.43) (5.29) (9.72) (8.10) 
BTM 0.126 0.065*** 0.052*** 0.075*** 0.063*** 
 (0.73) (11.70) (7.71) (13.41) (10.49) 
ROE -0.186*** 0.007 0.002 0.004 0.006 
  (0.70) (0.15) (0.39) (0.59) 
VROE  0.006    
  (0.35)    
GOVDISC -0.032 0.128*** 0.017 0.129*** 0.135*** 
 (-1.27) (7.74) (0.92) (7.71) (6.92) 
FIRMHERF 1.460*** 4.978*** 1.700*** 4.361*** 5.047*** 
 (4.68) (15.77) (4.10) (13.66) (13.65) 
INDHERF 0.011 -0.079 0.113 -0.053 0.066 
 (0.16) (-1.05) (1.35) (-0.69) (0.79) 
GDP 0.021 0.174*** 0.159*** 0.190*** 0.173*** 
 (1.54) (12.93) (11.06) (14.67) (8.39) 
VGDP 0.004 0.135*** -0.020* 0.168*** 0.151*** 
 (0.42) (13.46) (-1.71) (17.08) (11.27) 
NFIRMS 0.097*** 0.085*** -0.070*** 0.029** 0.102*** 
 (8.09) (6.22) (-3.86) (2.10) (5.46) 
CSIZE 0.003 0.107*** 0.042*** 0.111*** 0.112*** 
 (0.93) (26.10) (7.38) (27.70) (22.80) 
Intercept -1.362*** 0.291 2.294*** 0.590*** -0.132 
 (-8.41) (1.57) (9.75) (3.23) (-0.53) 
Country FE No No No No No 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.223 0.322 0.265 0.299 0.323 
Observations 34,085 33,426 14,231 29,205 30,767 
This table presents the regression results of idiosyncratic volatility on political connections and other control 
variables using alternative specifications and samples. The definitions of the variables are described in Appendix 1. 
The sample period is from 1997-2005. Model (1) presents the results after all firm-specific variables have been 
adjusted by the respective country-median values. Model (2) presents the results after including VROE (the volatility 
of return on equity). Models (3) to (5) present the results after excluding observations from USA, UK, and Japan; 
the years of Asian financial crisis (1997-1998); and countries with less than 5 politically connected firms, 
respectively. The t-statistic for each coefficient is reported in the parenthesis and is based on White’s 
heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 6   The role of different types of connections and controlling for endogeneity and selection bias 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   2SLS Heckman 
CONNECTED_OWNER -0.132***    
 (-2.96)    
CONNECTED_DIR -0.010    
 (-0.31)    
CONNECTED_LEADER  -0.106   
  (-1.48)   
CONNECTED_MP  0.003   
  (0.10)   
CONNECTED_CLOSE  -0.053   
  (-0.61)   
CONNECTED   -0.404*** -0.407*** 
   (-4.41) (-4.31) 
IMR    0.000 
    (0.18) 
SIZE -0.187*** -0.187*** -0.181*** -0.181*** 
 (-57.43) (-57.38) (-50.61) (-50.40) 
LEV 0.176*** 0.176*** 0.171*** 0.171*** 
 (8.73) (8.76) (8.55) (8.54) 
BTM 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 
 (11.65) (11.64) (11.27) (11.26) 
ROE 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.17) (0.15) (-0.10) (-0.10) 
GOVDISC 0.125*** 0.126*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 
 (7.66) (7.72) (7.04) (7.04) 
FIRMHERF 4.849*** 4.798*** 5.010*** 5.011*** 
 (15.68) (15.47) (16.08) (16.08) 
INDHERF -0.073 -0.077 -0.020 -0.021 
 (-0.98) (-1.02) (-0.26) (-0.27) 
GDP 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.180*** 0.180*** 
 (13.23) (13.11) (13.58) (13.57) 
VGDP 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.143*** 0.143*** 
 (14.01) (14.05) (14.24) (14.24) 
NFIRMS 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 
 (6.20) (6.10) (5.78) (5.75) 
CSIZE 0.106*** 0.107*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 
 (26.62) (26.56) (26.72) (26.71) 
Intercept 0.029 0.040 -0.181*** -0.181*** 
 (0.16) (0.22) (-50.61) (-50.40) 
Country FE No No No No 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.322 0.322 0.322 0.322 
Observations 34,085 34,085 34,085 34,085 
Models (1) and (2) of this table present the regression results of idiosyncratic volatility on different types of political 
connections and other control variables. Models (3) and (4) of this table present the results after controlling for 
endogeneity and selection bias using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) and Heckman (1979) regression 
methodologies, respectively. The definitions of the variables are described in Appendix 1. The sample period is from 
1997-2005. IMR is the inverse-mills ratio from the first-stage probit model of determinants of political-connections. 
The t-statistic for each coefficient is reported in the parenthesis and is based on White’s heteroskedasticity corrected 
standard errors. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7   The role of country-level institutional factors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Low 
Corruption 
High 
Corruption 
Pooled 
Sample 
Low  
Access 
High 
Access 
Pooled 
Sample 
Low Media 
Penetration 
High Media 
Penetration 
Pooled  
Sample 
CONNECTED 0.032 -0.100*** -0.001 -0.094** 0.007 -0.006 -0.087** 0.015 0.032 
 (0.84) (-2.68) (-0.04) (-2.40) (0.20) (-0.16) (-2.19) (0.36) (0.78) 
LOWINST   -0.406***   -0.315***   0.141*** 
   (-16.62)   (-20.89)   (5.45) 
CONNECTED×LOWINST   -0.121**   -0.115**   -0.191*** 
   (-2.34)   (-2.18)   (-3.37) 
SIZE -0.183*** -0.182*** -0.186*** -0.180*** -0.184*** -0.184*** -0.173*** -0.183*** -0.184*** 
 (-43.81) (-38.61) (-58.04) (-35.44) (-46.85) (-58.15) (-27.56) (-48.99) (-55.58) 
LEV 0.180*** 0.171*** 0.169*** 0.171*** 0.186*** 0.175*** 0.133*** 0.206*** 0.174*** 
 (6.35) (6.51) (8.56) (6.18) (6.88) (8.90) (3.99) (8.12) (8.36) 
BTM 0.109*** 0.066*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.092*** 0.076*** 0.055*** 0.122*** 0.078*** 
 (10.46) (11.18) (13.50) (11.04) (10.41) (14.18) (6.68) (15.61) (13.30) 
ROE 0.000 -0.003 0.002 -0.012 -0.003 0.005 0.020 -0.008 0.008 
 (0.02) (-0.23) (0.22) (-0.73) (-0.27) (0.56) (1.08) (-0.69) (0.83) 
GOVDISC -0.322*** -0.020 -0.171*** -0.058* -0.002 -0.086*** -0.077** 0.738*** 0.198*** 
 (-3.99) (-0.77) (-6.87) (-1.72) (-0.04) (-4.45) (-2.56) (9.44) (10.48) 
FIRMHERF 0.835 2.998*** 2.154*** 3.379*** 0.949* 4.069*** 0.883 0.951* 5.921*** 
 (1.60) (6.18) (6.61) (6.28) (1.75) (13.47) (1.45) (1.69) (17.73) 
INDHERF -0.274** 0.174* 0.001 0.259*** -0.197* -0.089 0.074 -0.196* -0.094 
 (-2.35) (1.92) (0.01) (2.66) (-1.91) (-1.20) (0.76) (-1.67) (-1.19) 
GDP 0.487*** 0.145*** 0.229*** 0.181*** 0.593*** 0.236*** 0.172*** 0.151* 0.193*** 
 (5.75) (9.81) (17.16) (10.79) (7.67) (17.81) (10.96) (1.80) (13.63) 
VGDP -0.047* -0.024* -0.002 0.014 -0.054** 0.094*** -0.092*** 0.184*** 0.166*** 
 (-1.82) (-1.78) (-0.14) (0.54) (-2.27) (9.84) (-3.76) (7.17) (13.18) 
NFIRMS 0.123*** -0.034* 0.091*** -0.004 0.120*** 0.080*** -0.028 0.060*** 0.100*** 
 (6.88) (-1.68) (6.83) (-0.18) (8.08) (6.00) (-1.02) (2.72) (5.65) 
CSIZE 0.046*** 0.027*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.033*** 0.108*** 0.012 0.068*** 0.123*** 
 (6.33) (3.94) (18.27) (3.78) (4.36) (29.12) (1.17) (6.20) (23.40) 
Intercept -1.524* 1.661*** 0.434** 0.730* -2.687*** -0.352* 1.830*** 0.646 -0.403** 
 (-1.90) (6.79) (2.49) (1.87) (-3.59) (-1.93) (6.27) (0.77) (-2.00)  
Country FE No No No No No No No No No  
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.306 0.245 0.333 0.254 0.325 0.336 0.278 0.344 0.331  
Observations 16,070 18,015 34,085 15,137 18,948 34,085 10,323 21,199 31,522  
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This table presents the regression results of firm-specific return variation on political connections, country-level institutional factors (LOWINST), and other 
control variables. LOWINST is a dummy variable which equals 1 for firms in corrupted countries, those in countries with low access to external equity market, 
and those in countries with low media penetration; or 0 otherwise. The definitions of the variables are described in Appendix 1. Models (1), (4), and (7) present 
the results for countries with low corruption, low access to external capital market, and low media penetration; respectively. Models (2), (5), and (8) present the 
results for countries with high corruption, high access to external capital market, and high media penetration; respectively. Models (3), (6), and (9) present the 
regression results for the pooled sample and include the interaction term between CONNECTED and FACTOR. The t-statistic for each coefficient is reported in 
the parenthesis and is based on White’s heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 8   Controlling for earnings quality, analyst following, share turnover, and insider ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CONNECTED 0.048 0.036 0.021 -0.007 
 (0.83) (0.68) (0.47) (-0.15) 
CORRUPT -1.422*** -1.485*** -1.445*** -1.480*** 
 (-10.73) (-11.43) (-10.93) (-11.42) 
CONNECTED×CORRUPT -0.186** -0.185** -0.202** -0.232** 
 (-2.21) (-2.23) (-2.37) (-2.54) 
EQ -0.089***    
 (-3.70)    
CONNECTED×EQ 0.094    
 (0.87)    
ANALYST  -0.075***   
  (-10.99)   
CONNECTED×ANALYST  -0.010   
  (-0.50)   
TURNOVER   -0.017***  
   (-7.63)  
CONNECTED×TURNOVER   -0.003  
   (-0.16)  
CLOSE    0.225*** 
    (12.99) 
CONNECTED×CLOSE    0.094 
    (1.14) 
SIZE -0.187*** -0.155*** -0.186*** -0.175*** 
 (-57.70) (-35.84) (-57.07) (-51.24) 
LEV 0.160*** 0.141*** 0.177*** 0.162*** 
 (7.82) (7.06) (8.92) (8.16) 
BTM 0.065*** 0.044*** 0.060*** 0.055*** 
 (11.91) (7.92) (11.12) (10.28) 
ROE 0.003 0.003 -0.008 -0.005 
 (0.33) (0.36) (-0.89) (-0.58) 
GOVDISC -0.270*** -0.260*** -0.288*** -0.243*** 
 (-6.46) (-6.35) (-6.89) (-5.95) 
FIRMHERF 3.155*** 3.616*** 3.441*** 3.839*** 
 (9.50) (11.00) (10.38) (11.47) 
INDHERF -0.029 -0.028 -0.054 -0.025 
 (-0.40) (-0.38) (-0.74) (-0.35) 
GDP 0.166*** 0.154*** 0.175*** 0.146*** 
 (12.71) (11.81) (13.30) (11.08) 
VGDP 0.103*** 0.121*** 0.107*** 0.130*** 
 (9.49) (11.03) (9.83) (11.72) 
NFIRMS 0.117*** 0.120*** 0.128*** 0.145*** 
 (8.24) (8.58) (8.98) (10.36) 
CSIZE 0.122*** 0.128*** 0.121*** 0.125*** 
 (28.29) (29.52) (28.17) (28.83) 
Intercept 0.316* -0.171 0.168 -0.118 
 (1.74) (-0.93) (0.91) (-0.64) 
Country FE No Yes No No 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.326 0.331 0.328 0.332 
Observations 34,085 34,085 34,085 34,085 
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This table presents the regression results of firm-specific return variation on political connections and other control 
variables, after controlling for the effects of earnings quality (EQ), analyst coverage (ANALYST), share turnover 
(TURNOVER), and insider ownership (CLOSE). The definitions of the variables are described in Appendix 1. The t-
statistic for each coefficient is reported in the parenthesis and is based on White’s heteroskedasticity corrected 
standard errors. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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NOTES
 
                                                 
1 In the United States and other advanced free economies, it is common for the government to seek the 
services of successful business leaders. “Coincidental” here refers to the possibility that these individuals 
would have been sought after by firms for their expertise and vision with or without the political or 
administrative office that they happen to hold. 
 
2 This result is only suggested by our findings. For example, less public information could increase the 
incremental benefit to informed investors of collecting private information and thereby spur investors into 
collecting more private information – which could improve the overall information environment.  
 
3 Using firm-level measure of opacity, the findings of Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian (2009) corroborate 
that of Jin and Myers (2006) as they find that firms with higher earnings opacity have lower IV.  
 
4 Rajagopal and Venkatachalam (2011) show that earnings quality is negatively related to IV. In a recent 
working paper, Chen, Sadique, Srinidhi, and Veeraraghavan (2015) argue that public disclosures 
concentrate information release at particular periods while reducing the private information collection at 
other times, resulting in lower IV. In other words, average IV over the year is reflective of private 
information collection rather than of public information release.  
 
5 Chan and Hameed (2006) further find that analyst coverage is negatively associated with idiosyncratic 
volatility for firms in emerging markets, which imply that increased analyst coverage leads to more public 
information rather than firm-specific information being revealed in the market. 
 
6 Transparency is an anathema for rent-seeking because it exposes both the firm and the connected 
individual to both the domestic and foreign media, and could ultimately result in the official losing his or 
her political position and the firm losing its reputation and forfeiting part of future revenues.  This makes 
opaqueness an essential characteristic of political rent-seeking. 
 
7 The data is available for download at http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar06_data_20031166.zip. We 
further obtain the detailed data on the types of connections from Mara Faccio. 
 
8 In the robustness test, we show that our main finding on the relationship between political connections 
and IV remains unaltered both qualitatively and quantitatively if we exclude the U.S. sample (which 
comprises more than one-quarter of our sample). 
 
9 The website of the World Bank World Development Indicator (WDI) database is: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator.  
 
10 The good government index is computed as an average of three separate indices: corruption, risk of 
expropriation, and risk of contract repudiation. 
 
11 We classify the firms into industries based on the classification by Fama and French (1997). 
 
12 In our unreported robustness tests, we re-estimate the baseline regression using alternatives clustering 
methods as suggested by Petersen (2009): country-level, country-year and firm-year clustering. The 
results are similar. 
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13 For this purpose, we exclude the country fixed-effects and only include industry and year fixed effects. 
 
14 All our main results are unchanged if we use monthly returns, instead of weekly returns in estimating 
IV. 
 
15 Controlling shareholders can enjoy the benefits that accrue to the firm more than the managers or 
shareholders in a diffuse-ownership structure. Therefore, they face less free-rider problem compared to 
other stakeholders in the firm.  
 
16 Specifically, we compute EQ as the difference between total current accruals (TCA) and expected 
performance adjusted total current accruals (EPTCA). TCA is calculated as change in current assets minus 
change in current liabilities minus the change in cash plus change in short-term debts, divided by lagged 
total assets. We then estimate a cross-sectional annual regression for each of the industry in our sample of 
TCA on the inverse of lagged total assets, lagged return on assets (Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005), and 
change in net sales divided by lagged total assets. The estimated coefficients are then multiplied by 
lagged total assets, lagged ROA, and change in net sales respectively to obtain EPTCA. 
  
17 Analyst following is set to zero for firms with missing analyst data on I/B/E/S. 
